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LITERATURE REVIEW
Why Study Tax History?, P. Harris & D. de Cogan (editors),
Studies in the History of Tax Law, Volume 9, Hart
Publishing Oxford, 2019
Since the beginning of this century, John Tiley organized
an annual tax history conference at Cambridge, a tradition
that was continued after his death under the leadership of
Peter Harris. These are the papers from the ninth
Cambridge Tax Law History Conference, held in July
2018. In the usual manner, the papers have been selected
from an oversupply of proposals for their interest and
relevance, and scrutinized and edited to the highest stan-
dard for inclusion in this prestigious series. The result is
an outstanding book, with many high quality contribu-
tions to historical tax research.
The papers fall within five basic themes. Four papers focus
on tax theory: Bentham; social contract and tax governance;
Schumpeter’s ‘thunder of history’; and the resurgence of the
benefits theory. Three involve the history of UK specific
interpretational issues: management expenses; anti-avoidance
jurisprudence; and identification of professionals. A further
three concern specific forms of UK tax on road travel, land and
capital gains. One paper considers the formation of Her
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and another
explains aspects of nineteenth-century taxation by reference
to Jane Austen characters. Four consider aspects of interna-
tional taxation: development of EU corporate tax policy;
history of Dutch tax planning; the important 1942 Canada–
US tax treaty; and the 1928 League of Nations model tax
treaties on tax evasion. Also included are papers on the effects
of World War I (WWI) on the New Zealand income tax and
development of anti-tax avoidance rules in China.
The papers are of obvious importance to tax historians.
But the majority of readers of this journal are not tax
historians, but rather tax academics and practitioners.
Why should they be interested in tax history?
One obvious answer is that it is frequently impossible
to understand the present state of tax law without know-
ing what led to it. Casebooks often make the mistake of
omitting cases that have been overturned by later enact-
ments. The result is that students are unable to compre-
hend the current law because they do not understand what
the lawmakers were trying to achieve. For a classic
exposition on this theme, read C.I. Kingson The Foreign
Tax Credit and its Critics, 9 Am. J. Tax Pol’y 1 (1991),
which explains in detail what were the loopholes that led
to the enactment of each of the ‘baskets’ in IRC section
904. This article should be required reading for anyone
who is concerned with tax complexity, especially since
after Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) we are back to five
baskets (there used to be only two from 2004 to 2017).
But there is another, deeper reason why we should care
about tax history: Solutions in tax tend to repeat themselves
in cyclical fashion, and therefore studying the past can suggest
remedies for current ills. For example, one of the common
proposals to fix the problem of cross-crediting under the
Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) regime is
applying the foreign tax credit limitation on a country by
country basis. That was the foreign tax credit regime that
prevailed before 1986, and thus studying the history of the
pre-1986 credit can help us understand the problems of enact-
ing this fix.
Another example is the limitation on benefits (LOB)
provision that is found in almost all US tax treaties. The
current model US tax treaty from 2016 treaty states that
treaty benefits are denied to a company unless:
ii) with respect to benefits under this Convention other than under
Article 10 (Dividends), less than 50 percent of the company’s gross
income, and less than 50 percent of the tested group’s gross income, is
paid or accrued, directly or indirectly, in the form of payments that
are deductible for purposes of the taxes covered by this Convention in
the company’s Contracting State of residence (but not including
arm’s length payments in the ordinary course of business for services
or tangible property), either to persons that are not residents of either
Contracting State entitled to the benefits of this Convention under
subparagraph (a), (b), (c) or (e) of this paragraph or to persons
that meet this requirement but that benefit from a
special tax regime in their Contracting State of residence
with respect to the deductible payment. (emphasis added).1
‘Special tax regime’ is a newly defined term:
Notes
1 US Model (2016), Art. 22(2)(b)(ii).
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l) the term ‘special tax regime’ with respect to an item of
income or profit means any legislation, regulation or admin-
istrative practice that provides a preferential effective rate
of taxation to such income or profit,
including through reductions in the tax rate or the
tax base. With regard to interest, the term special tax regime
includes notional deductions that are allowed with respect to
equity. However, the term shall not include any legislation,
regulation or administrative practice:
i) the application of which does not disproportionately benefit
interest, royalties or other income, or any combination thereof;
ii) that, with regard to royalties, satisfies a substantial
activity requirement;
iii) that implements the principles of Article 7 (Business
Profits) or Article 9 (Associated Enterprises);
iv) that applies principally to persons that exclusively promote
religious, charitable, scientific, artistic, cultural or educa-
tional activities;
v) that applies principally to persons substantially all of the
activity of which is to provide or administer pension or
retirement benefits;
vi) that facilitates investment in entities that are marketed
primarily to retail investors, are widely-held, that hold real
property (immovable property), a diversified portfolio of secu-
rities, or any combination thereof, and that are subject to
investor-protection regulation in the Contracting State in
which the investment entity is established; or
vii) that the Contracting States have agreed shall not con-
stitute a special tax regime because it does not result in a low
effective rate of taxation (emphasis added).2
This means that the withholding tax reductions of the treaty
will not apply to a company 50% or more of its income (or
of the income of its consolidated group) is paid in deductible
payments either to residents of third countries or to a
company in the treaty partner country that is subject to a
low effective tax rate because of a ‘special tax regime’.
One might think that this is a completely novel provi-
sion, because it implements the ‘single tax principle’ (i.e.
international taxation should aim to prevent both double
taxation and double non-taxation), which itself derives
from the G20/OECD BEPS-project of 2013–2015. As
the new preamble to the OECD model now states:
(State A) and (State B) … Intending to conclude a
Convention for the elimination of double taxation with respect
to taxes on income and on capital without creating oppor-
tunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through
tax evasion or avoidance … (emphasis added)3
According to this interpretation, the nature of the LOB
changed after Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS).
Before 2016, the LOB was designed to prevent the US
from having a ‘treaty with the world’, i.e. enabling tax-
payers from non-treaty countries to invest into the US
through a designated treaty. This was the role of the US-
Netherlands Antilles treaty before it was terminated in
1984. After BEPS, the LOB is designed to implement the
single tax principle.
However, it turns out that there is nothing new under
the sun, if one looks back far enough. The first US model
tax treaty dates to 1981, and it included the following
language in the LOB provision:
3. Any relief from tax provided by a Contracting State to a
resident of the other Contracting State under the Convention
shall be inapplicable to the extent that, under the law in force
in that other State, the income to which the relief relates bears
significantly lower tax than similar income arising within
that other State derived by residents of that other State.4
This language is conceptually the same as the ‘special tax
regime’ language in the current model LOB. It disap-
peared from the 1996 and 2006 versions of the US
model but is now back in the 2016 model.
Moreover, the roots of the 1981 LOB language can be
traced even further back. The first US treaty that indicated
that double non-taxation of US source income was inap-
propriate was the treaty with Luxembourg (1962), which
precluded the application of reduced US withholding rates
to certain Luxembourgian holding corporations that were
not subject to tax on a residence basis. Similar language
appears in the 1963 protocol to the Antilles Treaty, in the
1970 US treaty with Finland and the 1975 US treaty with
Iceland. The U.K. treaty of 1975 imposed limitations
on the benefits of corporate residents if the tax
imposed by the residence country was ‘substantially
less’ than the general corporate tax and 25%.
Ultimately, the origin of the 2016 special tax regime
provision can be traced back to the work of Stanley
Surrey in the 1950s and 1960s.5
Another example is the contemporary notion that deduc-
tions for interest or royalties should not be allowed unless
there is a corresponding inclusion on the payee side that
results in a minimum level of tax paid. This is reflected in
the US United States Base Erosion Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT)
(although it unfortunately does not take into account
whether a minimum tax level is imposed) and in the
OECD’s GLOBE proposal (Pillar II of BEPS 2.0).
Notes
2 US Model (2016), Art. 3(1)(l).
3 OECD Model Tax Convention (2017), preamble.
4 United States Dept. of Treasury Model Income Tax Treaty (1981), Art. 22.
5 See R. S. Avi-Yonah, Who Invented the Single Tax Principle? An Essay on the History of US Treaty Policy, 59 NYLS L. Rev. 305 (2015).
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Once again, a look at the history shows that this idea is
in fact very old in international tax terms. It is in fact
included in the very first League of Nations model of
1927, which is discussed in the Harris et al. volume.
And the rationale given for it in the commentary sounds
very modern as well:
From the very outset, the Committee realized the necessity of
dealing with the questions of tax evasion and double taxation
in co-ordination with each other. It is highly desirable that
States should come to an agreement with a view of ensuring
that a taxpayer shall not be taxed on the same income by a
number of different countries, and it seems equally desirable
that such international co-operation should prevent certain
incomes from escaping taxation altogether. The most elemen-
tary and undisputed principles of fiscal justice, therefore,
required that the experts should devise a scheme whereby all
incomes would be taxed once and once only’. (emphasis
added).6
As Gianluca Mazzoni has shown, this early enunciation
of the single tax principle reflects primarily the views of
Charles Clavier of Belgium, a now forgotten but originally
very important member of the group of technical experts
that drafted the original model.7
We should, of course, not assume that these instances
necessarily show that the earlier examples influenced the
latter. The converse is more likely to be the case: Faced
with similar issues, tax policy makers reached similar
conclusions without knowing about earlier similar solu-
tions. But surely it makes more sense to study the tax
history rather than reinventing the wheel. The Harris et
al. volume and the entire series that it is part of are major
contributions to this endeavour. Otherwise, we are indeed
doomed to repeat the history we have forgotten.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
The University of Michigan
aviyonah@umich.edu.
Notes
6 League of Nations, Commentary on Model Tax Treaty (1927).
7 G. Mazzoni, Present at the Creation: Archival Research and Evidence on the Origins of the Single Tax Principle, 47(10) Intertax 813–831 (2019).
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